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AM. J. CRIM. L.
I. Introduction
For decades, criminal justice officials have based key decisions
about a defendant's fate and crime deterrence on a tool deplored by
practitioners for its indecipherability and potential for inaccuracy or
incompleteness-the rap sheet.1  Though the Supreme Court's criminal
rights evolution progressed late last year to requiring rigor in documenting
penalty maximum-enhancing prior convictions,2 the problem of the rap
sheet has received little notice from jurists and scholars because the rap
sheet plays its central role in discretionary decision-making areas shielded
from scrutiny.
3
The rap sheet is not just a practitioner's problem. The flawing of
the rap sheet is a parable about the perils of a judicial doctrine that was
ostensibly overruled and then resurrected in a more potent incarnation. The
story of how rap sheet flaws came to be is also a tale of federal timidity in
taking an essential leadership role because of judicial rhetoric and rules
about noninterference with traditional state functions like criminal law
enforcement. Lost in the contortions of the traditional state functions
doctrine over the decades is a necessary countervailing federalism-based
doctrine permitting national leadership on problems calling for a
coordinated solution.
The federal government has no business and no interest in
regulating many issues within domains traditionally controlled by the states.
But submerged within traditional state domains are problems, like rap sheet
flaws, that call for national policy innovation and leadership unchilled by
federal timidity in spheres of traditional state control.
This article finds buried in the rise, demise, and stealth resurrection
of the traditional state functions doctrine the roots of a countervailing
principle. The contours of the principle have been obscured in the
contortions of federalism doctrine over the decades. This article derives
from the evolution of the traditional state functions doctrine a
countervailing federalism-based principle permitting fruition of federal
leadership on problems submerged in state spheres but requiring national
coordination.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part II details the rise, ostensible
demise, and resurrection of the doctrine of noninterference with traditional
state functions. Part II analyzes how, though the doctrine was superficially
1. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE, at 38 (2001)
[hereinafter USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY] ("In the view of most experts,
inadequacies in the accuracy and completeness of criminal history records is the single most serious
deficiency affecting the Nation's criminal history record information systems.").
2. See Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1260 (2005) (majority in part, plurality in part)
(limiting the materials on which jurists may rely on finding the fact of a prior conviction to "conclusive
records made or used in adjudicating guilt").
3. See infra, Part III.A.
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overruled, it mutated into more potent rules by the Court constricting the
reach of federal legislation and interpretation of Congress's legislative
power.
Part III explains how perpetuation of the repudiated notion deterred
needed national leadership and policy innovation on an issue requiring a
coordinated solution. Part III's account of the struggles over management
of the computerized criminal history reporting system behind the rap sheet
shows how federalism fears, stemming from notions of noninterference
with a traditional area of state control, lead the national government to
abdicate an essential leadership and standards-setting role.
Part IV details the two chief consequences of the leadership chilling
effect on coordinating criminal history reporting: (1) accuracy,
completeness, and decipherability problems of the rap sheet that have
persisted to the present day; and (2) the costs to effective, accurate and
efficient criminal justice posed by the persistent problems.
Part V derives from the doctrine surrounding the rise, demise and
resurrection of the traditional state functions shield a countervailing
federalism-derived principle permitting national leadership on problems
submerged in spheres of traditional state control but requiring a national
solution. Part V details how the countervailing principle would foster
federal policy innovations in reforming the criminal rap sheet and address
the new need, wrought by Shepard v. United States, for criminal justice
information systems to contain scanned certified copies of court records
"made or used in adjudicating guilt.'A
II. The Rise, Demise and Resurrection of the Traditional State
Functions Doctrine
A. The Rise
The doctrinal tale of the rise, demise, and resurrection of the
traditional state functions is a story of contestation over power and the right
of oversight between institutional actors. As Congress flexed its legislative
authority in the New Deal era, states and state actors went to court to protest
over the intrusion into state prerogatives. Ultimately, the courts flexed the
most muscle of all during the contestation, wielding judicial power to strike
legislation.
To summarize the story's start, state attempts to insulate
"traditional" or "sovereign" state functions from federal regulation did not
fare well before 1976. Though precedents foreclosed the claim, states and
their agencies and officials kept trying when federal policy innovations
affected their operations. The balance began to tip after Justice William
Rehnquist ascended to the Court in 1972.
4. See Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1260, 1263.
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Maryland v. Wirtz5 encapsulates the law before Justice Rehnquist
took the bench.6  Under the banner of protecting "sovereign state
functions," 28 states and a school district appealed to the Supreme Court in
1968, after Congress extended federal minimum wage and overtime
requirements to protect employees in state hospitals, institutions, and
schools. 7 The states and district argued that even federal regulation validly
enacted under Congressional commerce clause power "must yield to state
sovereignty in the performance of governmental functions."8 The Supreme
Court rejected the argument, relying on its precedent in United States v.
California.9 The Court, in United States v. California, ruled that federal
regulation validly enacted under one of Congress's enumerated powers does
not fail just because it extends to "activities in which the states have
traditionally engaged.'
10
Given this line of precedent, Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, easily disposed of the next cry of foul to state sovereignty in Fry
v. United States." This time, the states chafed against a federally mandated
wage freeze that extended to freezing salaries of state employees, in an
attempt to bridle surging inflation. 12  Two state employees brought suit,
claiming that the freeze on their salaries interfered impermissibly with
"sovereign state functions."' 13
Fry rejected the argument that legislation validly enacted under the
Commerce Clause fails upon interference with "sovereign state functions;"
Wirtz had already held to the contrary.' 4 Justice Marshall noted that when
the need to curb inflation compelled the freeze in 1971, state and local
governmental employees represented fourteen percent of the national
workforce. 15  Justice Marshall concluded: "It seems inescapable that the
effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically impaired if wage
increases to this sizeable group of employees were left outside the reach of
these emergency federal wage controls."' 6
Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. 17 Justice Rehnquist wrote
that Wirtz was wrongly decided. 18  Constitutional protections for state
5. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
6. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
7. Id. at 187, 193.
8. Id. at 195.
9. 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197-98.
10. Id. at 198 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1937)).
11. 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 547-48.
15. Id. at 548.
16. Id.
17. Justice Douglas wrote a terse paragraph stating that because the wage freeze had expired,
certiorari should have been dismissed. Id. at 549 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sovereignty signified that "traditional state functions" were beyond the
reach of congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. 19 A
State challenging encroachment on this affirmative constitutional protection
was not arguing a lack of legislative power but "asserting an affirmative
constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such
congressionally asserted authority. 20
Perhaps, Justice Rehnquist wrote, federal incursions into traditional
state functions might survive if predicated on Congress's legislative
authority during wartime, or under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 21 But enactments under the Commerce Clause must yield in
traditionally state domains.22 He did not explain the distinction. But the
Court would later explain that the distinction was because the
Reconstruction amendments "were specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty., 23 Justice Rehnquist
concluded by calling for the overruling of Wirtz.24
Perhaps as reassurance to Justice Rehnquist, or perhaps to
accommodate others in the majority coalition, such as Justices Powell,
Burger and Blackmun, Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Fry noted, in
a footnote:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been
surrendered,"... it is not without significance. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
25
The next year, the sole dissent would become law, and the footnote would
become the foundation for the new construction atop overturned precedent.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,26 the States, joined by cities
and intergovernmental groups, were back at protesting minimum wage and
overtime laws, now applicable to all formerly shielded state employees
except executive, administrative or professional personnel.27 This time,
19. Id. at 557-58.
20. Id. at 543.
21. Id. at 558-59.
22. Id. at 559.
23. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xiii-xv, 293-94 (1998) (explaining that the
Reconstruction amendments broadened congressional authority to regulate the States because the
amendments were forged in the understanding of the need for federal succor following slavery and the
Civil War).
24. Fry, 421 U.S. at 559.
25. Id. at 547 n.7 (majority opinion)
26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
27. Id. at 837-38.
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Justice Rehnquist's view won the vote of four other justices, and he wrote
the majority opinion.
Justice Rehnquist held that "there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every State government which may not be impaired by
Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from
exercising the authority in that manner.".28 Quoting Justice Marshal's
Tenth Amendment footnote in Fry, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "This Court
has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary
powers to tax or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the
Constitution."
29
Justice Rehnquist invoked a notion of constitutional protection for
"the independent authority of the States" "within their proper spheres." 30
States had "plenary authority" over "'functions essential to separate and
independent existence"' that Congress could not abrogate. 31  Therefore,
National League of Cities held, regulation cannot interfere with "the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government
functions.' 32  What constituted the "traditional governmental functions"
immunized from federal regulation? National League of Cities set forth no
clear test but gave examples: "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation., 33 In a final coup de grace, Justice
Rehnquist overruled Wirtz, as he had called for in dissent just the year
before.34
But Justice Rehnquist upheld Fry in a passage suggesting that
sovereign state spheres where not wholly impenetrable. 35  In explaining
why Fry remained valid, National League of Cities suggested a possible
countervailing principle:
The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an extremely
serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the
component parts of our federal system and which only collective
action by the National Government might forestall. The means
selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the
States' freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time.
The effect of the across-the-board freeze . displaced no state
28. Id. at 845.
29. Id. at 843.
30. Id. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868).
31. Id. at 845-46 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
32. Id. at 851-52.
33. Id. at 851.
34. Id. at 853-55.
35. Compare Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (arguing
that Fry transgressed the Tenth Amendment) with Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53 (holding
that Fry is consistent with the Tenth Amendment holding).
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choices as to how governmental operations should be structured,
nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves ....
Finally, the Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the
pressures upon state budgets rather than increase them .... The
limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks
to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude
temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency.
"[A]lthough an emergency may not call into life a power which
has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." 36
Thus, Congress could penetrate traditional state spheres with narrowly
tailored, time-limited legislation to address problems that require
"collective action by the National Government" so long as Congress was
acting within its constitutional grants of legislative power.
Justice Blackmun, the swing voter 37 in National League of Cities'
5-4 majority, wrote a brief concurrence to underscore that National League
of Cities did not "outlaw federal power . . . where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential. 38  Justice Blackmun's concurrence
and Justice Rehnquist's caveat sketched the contours of a possible
countervailing principle to the traditional state functions doctrine for
problems requiring nationally coordinated solutions. The indistinct
contours of the potential principle were never delineated, however, because
federalism doctrine soon shifted.
B. The Demise
Given its foundation on felled precedent and a tentative swing vote,
National League of Cities naturally lurched. The shift started nearly
imperceptibly.
The Court again confronted a claim of federal interference with a
traditional state function when coal miners brought suit to invalidate the
federal Surface Mining Act, which was enacted to protect land from
destructive coal-mining, and gave states the choice of implementing plans
that met federal standards or face federal preemption. 39  Relying on
National League of Cities, the district court ruled the legislation
contravened the Tenth Amendment by interfering with the States'
40
"traditional [governmental] function[]" of regulating land use.
Justice Marshall, author of Fry, wrote the majority opinion, and
36. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)).
37. Blackmun's hesitant concurrence beginning, "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion," marks
him as the swing voter. William Cohen, Justice in the Balance, 81 VA. L. REV. 927, 942 n. 130 (1995).
38. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856.
39. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 271-72, 280-81 (1981).
40. Id. at 273-74.
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structured National League of Cities' celebration of the Tenth Amendment
into a more contoured and limited four-part test. Justice Marshall ruled that
petitioners asserting the invalidity of federal legislation enacted under
congressional commerce clause power must show three things: (1) "the
challenged statute regulates the 'States as States,"' (2) the regulation
addresses "matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty"'
and (3) the States' "compliance with the. .. law would directly impair their
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions." '4 In a footnote, Justice Marshall also alluded that intervention
may be permissible for "situations in which the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies state submission.' 42
The challenge to the Surface Mining Act failed on the first prong,
the Court ruled, because the Act governed the activities of coal miners, not
States as States.43 The Act did not compel states to enforce federal
standards, spend state money or participate in a federal program at all. 44 If
a state refused to submit a compliant program, then the federal government
45would regulate the coal miners.
In the Surface Mining Act, Justice Marshall saw a friendlier form of
federalism than the jostling for turf of the state functions view. He wrote
that the Act, at most, "establishes a program of cooperative federalism that
allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards,
to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet
their own particular needs. 46 Justice Rehnquist concurred hesitantly in the
result.4
7
Justice Rehnquist would be among the dissenters, however, when
the Court considered a Congressional policy innovation to address the
heavy consumption of oil and gas by electrical utilities.48 Among other
things, the legislation required state energy regulators to "consider" federal
standards during utilities rule-making and mandated notice and comment
procedures for state regulators to follow during the consideration.49 The
district court ruled the provisions violated the Tenth Amendment, finding
that "they constitute a direct intrusion on integral and traditional functions
of the State of Mississippi." 50
41. Id. at 287-88 (quoting Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852).
42. Id. at 288 n.29.
43. Id. at 288.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 289.
47. Id. at 307, 307-13. Justice Rehnquist wrote in order to note his disquiet over whether the Court
was broadening Congressional power to enact legislation under the claim of substantial effects on
commerce. Id. at 313.
48. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 (1982); see also id at 782
n.9 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (musing that the "novelty" of the statutory scheme may have obscured the
affront to National League of Cities posed by the statute).
49. Id. at 746, 749.
50. Id. at 753.
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The swing voter on National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun,
wrote for the majority and found no Tenth Amendment violation. Justice
Blackmun converted the requirement that state authorities consider federal
standards and procedural requisites into a choice: "if a State has no utilities
commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even
entertain the federal proposals.' He acknowledged the choice was
coercive, because states cannot easily abandon the historically state duty of
regulating public utilities and, unlike in the Surface Mining Act, Congress
did not provide for an alternative mechanism to fill the regulatory void if
the state opted out.52  But, Justice Blackmun ruled, "it cannot be
constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move
the States to act in a given way, or even to coerc[e] the States into assuming
a regulatory role by affecting their freedom to make decisions in areas of
integral governmental functions. 53
Sandra Day O'Connor, the newest Justice on the Court and a
former state legislator and state judge, penned a vividly indignant partial
dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. She believed
the mandate that states consider federal standards and follow prescribed
procedure violated the Tenth Amendment restrictions divined in National
League of Cities.54 The emphatic phrases she used were so striking, the
majority collected a few choice ones:
Justice O'Connor's partial dissent . . variously accuses us of
"conscript[ing] state utility commissions into the national
bureaucratic army," of transforming state legislative bodies into
"field office of the national bureaucracy," of approving the
"dismemberment of state government," of making state agencies
"bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government," and-most
colorfully-of 5permitting "Congress to kidnap state utility
commissions."
Justice O'Connor's vivid partial dissent demonstrated that Justice
Rehnquist had a new ally with an equal ardor for state independence.
Though Justice Blackmun had labored mightily in FERC to avoid
grappling with National League of Cities and falling into the Tenth
Amendment fray, Justice Brennan took National League of Cities head-on
the next year and watered it down. Justice Brennan, who had authored an
anguished dissent for three justices in National League of Cities,56 mustered
51. Id. at 764.
52. Id. at 766-67.
53. Id. at 766 (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id. at 775-82.
55. Id. at 767 n.30 (quoting O'Connor's dissent at 775, 777, 782, 783, and 790).
56. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856-880 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 856, 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (characterizing Justice Brennan's dissent as "despairing[]").
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a majority in EEOC v. Wyoming 57 for the proposition that "National League
of Cities is a functional doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create
a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits
of a federal system in which the States enjoy a 'separate and independent
existence[.]' ''58 Justice Brennan read into the third prong of the National
League of Cities-Hodel test a high bar for showing impairment of state
control over traditional governmental functions-federal intrusion must
threaten States' "separate and independent existence., 59 Given the raised
bar, Wyoming's Tenth Amendment challenge to the application of federal
age discrimination protections to a state game warden failed, even though
"[t]he management of state parks is clearly a traditional state function." 60
The express toppling of National League of Cities came in 1985,
when the allies against National League of Cities succeeded in winning
swing voter Justice Blackmun to their camp.61 In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, a 5-4 majority overruled National League
of Cities's "traditional governmental function" standard as "unworkable. 62
The issue again was federal minimum wage and overtime laws.63
The state governmental function was mass transit, which, though state-run,
received federal subsidies.64 Four months after National League of Cities,
the San Antonio Transit System informed its employees that it was no
longer obligated to follow the Fair Labor Standards Amendments'
provisions on overtime.65 The Department of Labor disagreed and state and
federal authorities went to district court, which ruled that "local public mass
transit systems . . . constitute integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions" and were shielded by National League of Cities.66
Federal authorities and a state employee appealed to the Supreme
Court.6 7 While the matter was pending, the Supreme Court unanimously
ruled that a commuter rail service run by the state-owned Long Island
Railroad was not a "traditional governmental function" and thus was not
immunized from regulation under National League of Cities.6 8 The Court
vacated the district court judgment in Garcia and other cases involving state
transit and remanded to the district court for reconsideration in light of its
recent railroad decision.69  The district court again found municipally-
57. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
58. Id. at 236 (quoting Nat ' League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
59. Id. at 239 (quoting Nat'lLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851).
60. Id.
61. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
62. Id. at 531.
63. Id. at 533.
64. Id. at 531-33.
65. Id. at 534.
66. Id. at 534-35 (quoting Appendix D to Juris. Statement in No. 82-1913 p.24a).
67. Id. at 535.
68. Id. (quoting United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982).
69. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982).
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owned and operated mass-transit to be a traditional governmental
function-though three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate
court had reached the opposite conclusion.
70
Surveying the scene of confused lower courts on standards for
defining traditional governmental functions, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, noted the Court itself had difficulties developing a measure of the
traditional. 71  The Court had relied on history but "simultaneously
disavowed 'a static historical view of state functions generally immune
from federal regulation."' 72 The Court had also stated the inquiry into the
traditional "was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute
at issue unduly handicaps 'basic state prerogatives'-but did not define
what a basic prerogative was. Because judicial determination of
"traditional" functions was "unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice," the Court rejected the standard and pointed to a different
"measure of state sovereignty"-the political process.74  Constitutional
design of the federal system ensured that the federal government "will
partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States] to be disinclined to invade
the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their
governments. 75
Justice Powell's dissent, the principle piece joined by all four
National League of Cities adherents, shows the lost attempt to keep Justice
Blackmun's vote. The dissent argued that Justice Blackmun's balancing
test in National League of Cities offered a workable standard for delineating
limits on congressional power in protected state domains. 76 In explaining
how the balancing approach offered a workable standard, however, the
dissent changed the Blackmun test's key features-reducing it to the
balancing "of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the
impact of exempting the States from its reach. 77  In Justice's Powell's
formulation, the focus was on an institutional battle, not the needs of the
nation and people for whom the safeguards of federalist structure were
designed.
In Justice Powell's changed version, the "central" inquiry was "how
closely the challenged action implicates the central concerns of the
Commerce Clause" 78-not whether federal leadership was essential.
Services like police protection and fire prevention were remote from
commerce and epitomized traditional governmental functions, and thus
70. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530, 535-36 (1985).
71. Id. at 538-39.
72. Id. at 539-40 (quoting United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 686).
73. Id. at 540 (quoting United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 686-87).
74. Id. at 546-47, 550.
75. Id. at 551 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 332 (B. Wright ed. 1961); see also id. at 555-
57.
76. Id. at 562.
77. Id. at 563 n.5.
78. Id.
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were shielded under Justice Powell's revised test. 79
In contrast, Justice Blackmun had sketched "a balancing approach
[that] does not outlaw federal power . . . where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential., 8 0  The central criterion of Justice
Blackmun's test was the need for collective action, not notions of what
constituted core Commerce Clause concerns, remote topical enclaves, or the
impact on the States.
Justice O'Connor also offered a dissent notable for its vision of "a
'burden of persuasion on those favoring national intervention"' and
characterization of national action as "exceptional in our polity, an intrusion
to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary
case. '81
Most notable of all was Justice Rehnquist's brief separate dissent.
Though only a paragraph long, it frankly predicted the course of the law to
come. Justice Rehnquist highlighted that Justice Powell's balancing test
and Justice O'Connor's approach were not "precisely congruent with
Justice Blackmun's views in 1976, when he spoke of a balancing approach
which did not outlaw federal power in areas 'where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater.' '8 2 "But," Justice Rehnquist concluded, "I do not
think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine
points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court."83
C. The Revival
Later the same year Garcia was decided, William W. Van Alstyne
memorably called Garcia "The Second Death of Federalism."84  Justice
Rehnquist's parting prediction would prove the more prescient, however.
The traditional state functions doctrine would be resurrected in the form of
potent interpretive rules curtailing the reach of federal legislation and
constricting interpretation of Congress's legislative power. The new rules
would not be limited by the other prongs of the National League of Cities-
Hodel test or the nascent Rehnquist-Blackmun principle.
1. Reincarnation as a Canon Crippling the Reach of Legislation
During the brief dominion of National League of Cities, deference
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id. at 580-81.
81. Id. at 587 (quoting Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COL. L. REV. 543, 544-45
(1954)).
82. Id. at 580 (quoting Nat "7 League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
83. Id.
84. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985).
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to states in spheres of traditional state control seeped into statutory
interpretation. But it was after Garcia overruled National League of Cities
that a general presumption against reading federal statutes as reaching
traditional state functions solidified.
During the brief regime of National League of Cities, the Court
considered whether a federal act concerning treatment for the mentally
disabled applied to all states or just states taking federal money.85 If the
legislation applied to all states, then Congress had used its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.86 But if the legislation only applied to
federally funded states, then Congress was merely deploying the power of
its purse.87 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, ruled: "Because such
legislation imposes congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and
because it often intrudes on traditional state authority, we should not
quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment., 88  The question was easy and the
Justice Rehnquist's note unnecessary, however, because the Solicitor
General had conceded that the legislation was enacted under Congressional
spending authority and applied only to states taking federal money.89 The
note nonetheless laid a beam for a rule of constrictive reading of legislation
to shield state autonomy.
Another enunciation of the noninterference presumption came just a
few months after the demise of National League of Cities. The author of
the principle dissent in Garcia, Justice Powell, wrote for a 5-4 majority:
"Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity...
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute." 90 The deferential rule derived from the Eleventh Amendment, not
the Tenth, and concerned the immunity of states from suits, a confined
question. But the clear statement rule would not be so confined.
The breakthrough was Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police.91 The question was whether states were "persons" subject to suit
under the venerable civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1983.92 Citing
Pennhurst and Atascadero, the Court characterized as "an ordinary rule of
statutory construction" the requirement that "if Congress intends to alter the
'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,' it must make its intent to do so 'unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.' 93 What had been an extraneous note in Pennhurst
State and School Hospital v. Halderman and a specialized rule for deciding
85. Pennhurst State & Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981).
86. Id. at 15-16.
87. Id. at 17-18.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
91. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id. at 65 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242).
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whether a state had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity had been
elevated to a general canon of construction.
But not just any canon. While many canons are neutral aids to
textual interpretation, governing grammar or punctuation, clear statement
rules "represent substantive policy choices. 94  Because clear statement
rules import considerations external to text, they may foreclose meanings
actually denoted by text and structure, frustrating Congressional intent.95
And when clear statement rules claim heritage in Constitutional values, they
take on "quasi-constitutional" status and can conjure up a "Stealth
Constitution," in the memorable words of William N. Eskridge, Jr. and
Philip R. Frickey.96
The stealth revival of ostensibly rejected constitutional doctrine
fully unfurled in Gregory v. Ashcroft.97 The question was whether federal
protections against age discrimination extended to state judges. In an
opinion for the majority marked with intellectual echoes of her Garcia
dissent, Justice O'Connor wrote that congressional power to legislate "in
areas traditionally regulated by the States" was an "extraordinary power in a
federalist system ...that we must assume Congress does not exercise
lightly."9
8
Garcia, Justice O'Connor wrote, "constrained" the Court from
examining federalism limits on congressional powers under the Commerce
Clause. 99 So Justice O'Connor reasoned around Garcia, writing that the
Court need not examine the federalism issue if, applying a "plain statement
rule," the Court concluded the challenged act did not apply to state
judges. 100  Justice O'Connor's plain statement rule was that, absent
unmistakably clear language, the Court would "not attribute to Congress an
intent to intrude on state governmental functions"--even if Congress
enacted legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 though the
Fourteenth Amendment was "specifically designed as an expansion of
federal power and intrusion on state sovereignty."'
10 2
The limiting reading avoided "a potential constitutional problem,"
Justice O'Connor wrote.' 0 3 But Garcia held that the political process was
94. Larry J. Obhof, Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of Federalism Principles
Through Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 132 (2004).
95. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921,
958-59 (1992); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1959 (1994).
96. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip R. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81-82 (1994).
97. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
98. Id. at 460.
99. Id. at 464.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 470.
102. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
103. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
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the "measure of state sovereignty."' 10 4  So how could legislation vetted
through the political process, without an allegation of procedural
breakdown, pose a potential constitutional problem? Not under the Garcia
conception of state sovereignty. But certainly under the National League of
Cities view. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have read Gregory as
reviving National League of Cities, "at least as a new super-strong rule of
statutory interpretation."' 0 5  Indeed, Gregory goes further in its
development of state sovereignty jurisprudence than Justice Rehnquist's
initial sketch in his Fry dissent. In his Fry dissent, Justice Rehnquist had
suggested that his view would accommodate the history of the
Reconstruction Amendments. 10 6 The new clear statement rule did not.
Gregory is further notable because Justice O'Connor had succeeded
in writing her dissenting view in Garcia about changing the burden of
persuasion regarding the validity of federal legislation into quasi-
constitutional law.'
0 7
Since its rapid evolution, the quasi-constitutional principle of
noninterference with traditional state functions has become prevalent. In a
dataset of cases limited to workplace law issues decided between 1969 and
2003, James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear found eleven opinions in which
a majority of the Supreme Court has applied what the authors call "an 'anti-
preemption' canon, presuming that absent explicit statutory language,
federal law should be understood not to interfere with traditional or core
state functions."'' 0 8  Ten of the eleven opinions were issued in 1984 or
later.10 9 Even the terminology of the canon unabashedly echoes the
terminology of National League of Cities-from Gregory's use of the
canon to shield "state governmental functions" to even more recent uses of
the canon by the Court to shield "traditional state functions."'" 0
Thus, the state functions doctrine mutated into a new and even
broader form. After the doctrine could not be wielded directly to strike
legislation because of Garcia, it took a new incarnation and accomplished
its aim indirectly by curtailing the reach of federal legislation into
traditional state functions.
104. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
105. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 623 (1992).
106. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975).
107. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587 (1985).
108. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Owasso Indep. School Dist. v. Falvo, 534
U.S. 426, 435 (2002); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 n.5 (2002) (quoting Falvo 534 U.S. at
435).
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2. Reincarnation as a Rule of Constrictive Reading of Congressional
Legislative Power
The revival would not be limited to a canon merely curtailing the
reach of federal legislation. The doctrine would be marshaled again as a
limit on congressional authority to legislate. Though congressional
legislation is generally presumed constitutional,"' where the legislation
trenched on traditional state functions, the state functions doctrine
manifested as a rule of constrictive reading of Congress' enumerated power
to act.
The opening came when Congress invoked its Commerce Clause
authority to pass the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which concerned both
criminal law enforcement and education, domains where "States historically
have been sovereign."' 12 Justice Rehnquist-now the Chief-wrote for the
Court that the reach of congressional Commerce Clause authority "'must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government"' so as not to
"'effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local.""'1 3  In other words, interpretation of congressional Commerce
Clause authority would be limited by federalism doctrine to stay out of
"what is local."
This holding was even broader than the holding of National League
of Cities. Concern over encroachment into traditional state spheres
manifested itself as a rule of constrictive reading of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority. Instead of holding that an otherwise valid exercise of
congressional Commerce Clause authority was curtailed by a cross-cutting
limitation, Lopez held that Congress was not acting within its Commerce
Clause authority. Lopez made its ruling into a limit on Congressional
authority to act, not simply a federalism limit on an otherwise valid exercise
of power.
In contrast, National League of Cities invalidated an enactment not
on the ground that Congress lacked an affirmative grant of legislative power
but that cross-cutting constitutional protections for state sovereignty
constrained an exercise of otherwise valid legislative power. 14 National
League of Cities did not constrict interpretation of independent
constitutional text because of the state functions doctrine. But Lopez did.
In dissent, Justice Souter discerned the stealth revival of the
rejected "notion that the commerce power diminishes the closer it gets to
customary state concerns."
'
"
15
Lopez would also go further than National League of Cities in
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (referring to criminal law enforcement and
education as domains where "States historically have been sovereign").
113. Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1936)).
114. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-43, 845 (1976).
115. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609.
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another way. National League of Cities only applied to regulation of the
"States as States." 116 The Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate the
states at all. It regulated individuals. No state had petitioned for review in
Lopez-a federally convicted criminal had. Even the National League of
Cities doctrine could not have invalidated the Act-the first prong of its test
would not have been met." 7  But the notion of the inviolability of
traditional state turf in Lopez was sufficient alone.
Justice Rehnquist would later write that the "noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central" to the decision in Lopez. 1 8 The
statute was a criminal one and "[u]nder our federal system, the 'States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law,"'
Justice Rehnquist wrote.119 If the Act was validly premised on Commerce
Clause authority, Justice Rehnquist warned, "it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement
,,120or education where States historically have been sovereign. Justice
Rehnquist concluded the Act exceeded congressional Commerce Clause
authority.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence underscores the revival of the
traditional state functions doctrine in more potent form. Justice Kennedy
wrote the Act interfered with education, "a traditional concern of the
States," and thus "upset[] the federal balance to a degree that renders it an
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power."'21
The rule of noninvasion of state turf would successfully swing
again at legislation with much stronger foundations. Congress did not make
findings about the impact on interstate commerce posed by ownership of
guns in school zones for the Gun-Free Schools Act. 12 But for the Violence
Against Women Act, which provided civil remedies for victims of gender-
motivated violence, Congress assembled a "mountain of data ... showing
the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce. '' 123
Again Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. Again, he emphasized
that federalism limited the scope of Commerce Clause power to preserve
"what is local."' 124 Again he emphasized the need to preserve for states
authority over the "traditional state concern" of criminal law
116. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
117. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)
(rejecting claim under National League of Cities because challenged regulation did not regulate "States
as States").
118. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
119. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
120. Id. at 564.
121. Id. at 580.
122. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
123. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 608 & n.3, 616 n.6.
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enforcement.'25 And he went a step further-suggesting that regardless of
aggregate affects on commerce, Congress could never regulate under the
commerce power on "the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims," which he viewed as quintessential of the "police power" withheld
from Congressional commerce clause authority.
1 6
Again Justice Souter, joined by new Justices Ginsberg and Breyer,
discerned the revival of the rejected past.127 Justice Souter read the majority
opinion as holding that "some particular subjects arguably within the
commerce power can be identified in advance as excluded" on grounds
such as "the States have traditionally addressed it in the exercise of the
general police power."' 128 But the Court had already repeatedly rejected the
theory of traditional state concern as a limit to Congressional power.
29
And the Court had already rejected the notion of "traditional state spheres
of action" in favor of a more fluid notion of politics mediating between
state and national interests.
130
Concerns over safeguarding state power also inflected the Court's
interpretation of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact laws enforcing the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Congress had amassed "voluminous" evidence of "pervasive
bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated
violence"--triggering Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce equal protection guarantees.'13  Even so, the Court
ruled, there were limits on Congress' power to redress discrimination "to
prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully
crafted balance of power between the States and the National
Government."'
32
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment did not
extend to regulating conduct by private individuals, the Court ruled. 33 And
the legislation was not congruent and proportional to the problem, the Court
further ruled. 34 The legislation visited consequences on the assailant, not
state actors who were remiss in their duties to protect victims of gender-
motivated violence by prosecuting the assailant. 35  Moreover, the
legislation applied nationally, though, in the Court's assessment, the data
125. Id. at 611.
126. Id. at618.
127. Id. at 640.
128. Id. at 639.
129. Id. at 645 (citing, inter alia, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276-77 (1981)).
130. Id. at 647.
131. Id. at 619-20.
132. Id. at 620.
133. Id. at 619-25.
134. Id. at 625-26.
135. Id.
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only demonstrated an under-enforcement problem in a few states.' 36
Thus, to protect the "balance of power between the States and the
National Government" Congress invalidated a federal remedy for Christy
Brzonkala, who by her account, was raped and assaulted by two men, one
of whom received no sanctions from the state school where she sought
redress, and the other of whom was merely suspended by the state school
for two semesters for "using abusive language."'1 37 As Senior Circuit Judge
John T. Noonan, Jr. depicted in his book Narrowing the Nation's Power,
the abstract clash of institutions had effaced the human need at the core of
governance. 
138
The Court plainly noted that its reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment was inflected by concern with maintaining a balance of power
between the states and the national government-though, as the Court has
recognized, the Reconstruction amendments "were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."'' 3
9
Though Morrison suggested its interpretation of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment Section 5 power flowed from precedent, as Robert C. Post and
Reva B. Siegel have noted, Morrison actually imposed a further
constriction on Congress' Section 5 power not rooted in the precedents
Morrison cited. 140  The Court imported the state action requirement of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on Congress' authority to
craft remedial legislation under Section 5.141 Thus, even if state
discriminatory action affronted the guarantees of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, triggering Congress' power to enact remedial
legislation, Congress was limited in its ability to redress the wrong. 42
Professors Siegel and Post wrote that "the Court never pauses to
explain what it finds so very alarming in Congress' use of Section 5 power
to create a civil cause of action for victims of gender-motivated
violence."' 143 An inference of what alarmed the Court can be drawn,
however, from its earlier-expressed concern over federal intrusion into the
"traditional state concern" of criminal law enforcement. 44 The legislation
had trodden on state turf-"the suppression of violent crime and vindication
136. Id. at 626-27.
137. Id. at 601-03.
138. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES 144-45 (2002).
139. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xiii-xv, 293-94 (1998) (arguing that the
Reconstruction amendments broadened congressional authority to regulate the States because they were
forged in the understanding of the need for federal succor following slavery and the Civil War).
140. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 474-76 (2000).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 481.
144. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611, 618.
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of its victims. ' 145
Thus, in Lopez and Morrison, the Court resurrected the traditional
state functions doctrine in more potent form. The doctrine influenced
interpretation of independent Constitutional text. The traditional state
functions doctrine had morphed into a rule of constrictive reading of
Congress' enumerated powers to enact legislation reaching into traditional
state spheres. National League of Cities held Congress may have the power
to legislate but cross-cutting constitutional protections for state sovereignty
stood in the way of an otherwise valid exercise of power.146 The new
interpretive rule of constrictive reading of independent text resulted in a
holding that Congress did not even have the power to legislate in the first
place.
In a sense, the Court had enshrined a clear statement rule of
constitutional interpretation. In interpreting the limits of Congress'
constitutional power to enact legislation, the Court presumed against
authority to penetrate traditional state spfieres in the absence of
unmistakably clear language to the contrary-a direct language that the
Constitution, by its spare and graceful architecture, could not supply.
When National League of Cities was overruled, Justice Rehnquist
calmly noted that debate on the finer points of a countervailing principle to
the traditional state functions doctrine need not be resolved in dissent
because the doctrine would be revived later. 147 Though the doctrine has
been revived in potent form, the Court has not developed the nascent
countervailing principle to permit national leadership when necessary.
Against the backdrop of the dramatic revival of the traditional state
functions doctrine unmitigated by limiting conditions, federal timidity in
the quintessentially state sphere of criminal law is unsurprising. Taking the
persistent problem of the criminal rap sheet, the next Part analyzes how the
rise of the traditional state functions doctrine followed by its powerful
revival without a mitigating countervailing principle has chilled necessary
federal action on a law enforcement problem requiring a nationally
coordinated solution.
III. Federal Tiptoeing In Traditional State Spheres and the Flawing of
the Criminal Rap Sheet
A. The Rap Sheet's Role
Because of its role in criminal justice and the necessary interstate
coordination for its generation, the rap sheet is a paradigmatic issue
requiring national leadership. The rap sheet's role may not be readily
familiar because it structures decision-making in areas outside of the showy
145. Id. at618.
146. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840-43, 845 (1976).
147. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985).
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centerpiece of criminal justice, the trial. This section supplies context
before proceeding to the history of federal timidity in managing rap sheet
reporting.
Rap sheets direct official decision-making at the key points in the
criminal process-from investigation to bail-setting to charging to plea-
bargaining to sentencing. The National Task Force on Increasing the
Utility of the Criminal History Record has identified twenty-eight points in
the life of a criminal case where officials rely on criminal history records as
a major basis for their decisions. 148 Mistakes in the rap sheet mean wrong
decisions involving a defendant's fate and unwarranted additional jail time
or, conversely, inadequate jail time to account for the seriousness of the
defendant's criminal history and the need for heightened deterrence. 1
49
At the investigation stage, police use criminal history to find
possible suspects or eliminate suspects imprisoned at the time a crime was
committed' 50 Criminal history information can also help support a search
warrant. 151 FBI officials estimate that two-thirds of people arrested for
serious offenses have prior arrests. 152 About twenty-five to thirty percent
are "multi-State" offenders, with "Federal and State records or arrests in
more than one state."
' 153
When police present their case to the prosecutor's office, criminal
history may mean the difference between a decision to prosecute or to cut
the defendant loose. Many jurisdictions have prosecution guidelines as to
when a case will be accepted for prosecution. Often, criminal history is a
key consideration in the guidelines. Prosecuting a first-time offender driven
by poverty to commit a nonviolent crime may not be the most judicious or
just use of limited prosecutorial resources-particularly if a jurisdiction
must deal with a flood of other offenders with much worse records
committing the same crime.
After arrest and acceptance of a case by the prosecutor's office,
criminal history is the key consideration about the amount of bail, if any,
the defendant must put up to get out of jail.154 Every state and the federal
system expressly permit criminal history to be considered when bail is set at
the initial appearance or modified later.155 Many states "require criminal
justice decisionmakers to take criminal history record information into
148. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INCREASING THE UTILITY OF THE
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE 7 (1995) [hereinafter
INCREASING THE UTILITY].
149. The National System for Interstate Exchange of Criminal History Records: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 98-
286 (1983) (statement of Donald L. Doemberg on behalf of the ACLU); INCREASING THE UTILITY,
supra note 148, at 7.
150. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
151. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
152. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 73.
153. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
154. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
155. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
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account."'
56
Rap sheet information may be the basis for jailing a person without
bail during the long pendency of adjudicatory proceedings though the
person has not been convicted of the charged offense. In many states and
the federal system, if the defendant's criminal record demonstrates
dangerousness or risk of flight, a court may order that the defendant be
imprisoned without bail. 157 In the federal system, if the defendant's record
reveals commission of a crime of violence or certain other crimes while on
pretrial release, a presumption in favor of imprisonment without bail
arises. 158 At detention hearings, rap sheet information is typically argued by
the prosecutor and minimized by the defense attorney in support of their
respective positions. 159
Rap sheets further steer prosecutorial decisions about what charges
to press, what plea bargain to give, and what sentences to seek. 160 As to
charging, all states statutorily permit or mandate that defendants with
specified numbers and types of criminal convictions be charged as repeat
offenders, habitual offenders, or career offenders subject to enhanced prison
terms.' 61 As to plea bargains, rap sheets can make the difference between a
defendant getting a deal and none at all. How good the deal is also depends
on the rap sheet. Rap sheets are particularly critical in busy jurisdictions
that offer defendants better deals--called "fast-track" early disposition
programs in the federal system-if they promise to plead out early. In such
jurisdictions, within a day or two after the defendant's arrest and initial
appearance, a prosecutor must study the rap sheet--often the only
documentation of prior criminal history in the file-to formulate an offer
that will materially affect the length of time the defendant will serve, if any.
Rap sheet information is so heavily relied on because it is
computer-searchable and comes fast. Criminal history information is
frequently needed fast. For example, information for bail-setting is
generally needed within 24 hours of arrest.162 Information for charging the
defendant by indictment or information or formulating a plea-bargain may
be needed within less than a week of arrest, particularly in jurisdictions
where prosecutors make early disposition offers.
Of all the multiple junctures where rap sheets matter, sentencing is
where rap sheets figure most prominently. Various theories of
punishment-"culpability (just punishment), deterrence, incapacitation and
156. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 50.
157. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 18-19; see also 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
159. See USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 19.
160. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 19.
161. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 19.
162. Sally T. Hillsman, Disposition Reporting: The Perspective from the Courts, in BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS: BRADY AND BEYOND 56 (1994).
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limited rehabilitation potential"-all point to the conclusion that criminal
history should matter greatly as to what sentence a defendant should get.
163
And it does: Guides for sentencing frequently calibrate sentence ranges to
criminal history.
164
The judge generally learns about criminal history from the
presentence report prepared by probation officers. 65  And probation
officers drafting presentence reports generally rely on fingerprint-verified
rap sheets as a starting point for criminal history assessments. 166 Probation
officers then follow up by performing the laborious task of requesting
documentation from the various jurisdictions where the defendant was
convicted for committing other crimes.
When the defendant goes to jail, the presentence report-including
its determination of the defendant's criminal history-goes too. The
presentence report guides correctional decisions on classification of the
defendant while in prison, parole decisions, and parole revocation decision
if the defendant errs on release. 167 Thus, from start to finish in the criminal
justice system, the rap sheet figures heavily in decisions materially affecting
a defendant's liberty and determining adequate deterrence against future
criminal conduct.
B. Federal Timidity in Managing Rap Sheet Reporting
The term rap sheet denotes the computer print-out that officials rely
on in decision-making. Behind that print-out is the computerized web of
criminal history storage systems that generated it. Within that web lies a
history of federal fears to tread in state turf, even though the accuracy of
criminal justice decisions was at stake.
To see the parallel trajectory of federal timidity and the ascendancy
of judicial protection for state turfism, a few more steps back in time are
needed. Before the era of National League of Cities, the federal
government took a leadership role in the development of national criminal
history reporting. Leadership called for delicate balancing between the
dominance of states with regard to criminal history generation and the need
163. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2004).
164. E.g, Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 18.U.S.C.S. app. §§ 4Al.1, 4A1.2
(2005).
165. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, § 11:1, at 482-83 (2004) (Presentence
reports "provide information upon which judges base virtually all sentence determinations .... No
single document has greater impact on criminal offenders than the presentence report.").
166. See, e.g., PROB. DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT 11 (1984) (instructing probation officers that "[t]he identification record
(fingerprint record) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a good source of information on the arrest
record of a defendant."). The probation office may also contact courts and correctional agencies to get
missing data and verify the accuracy of rap sheet information. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 22.
167. CAMPBELL, supra note 165, at 482-83.
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for national leadership. A Congressional report framed the issue:
Because of the decentralized nature of the U.S. criminal justice
system and because the generation and use of criminal history
information occurs mostly at the State and local levels of
government, the States have a primary stake in establishing
standards and procedures for the keeping and dissemination of
criminal history information. On the other hand, minimum
national standards also are required." 1
68
In 1924, as fingerprint identification rapidly became a fixture in the
criminal justice system, Congress directed the FBI to create an
Identification Division to obtain and store fingerprint information to
facilitate criminal identification. 69 The Identification Division began with
800,000 fingerprints, gleaned from the files of the federal prison at
Leavenworth, Kansas, an FBI precursor called the Identification Bureau,
and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which had established
the first "'national' criminal identification system."'170 Between the 1920s
and mid-1960s, the FBI records were only manually searchable by name,
other biographic identifiers, and FBI number. 171 The records were "finger-
print supported," meaning that each record had a fingerprint card to provide
positive identification.
172
In 1967, the FBI established the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC). 173 The same year, a commission appointed by President Lyndon
B. Johnson published a call for "a national law enforcement directory that
records an individual's arrest for serious crimes, the disposition of each
case, and all subsequent formal contacts with criminal justice agencies
related to those arrests."' 17 4 In response, the Department of Justice started
Project SEARCH, a consortium of States with the duty of developing a
computerized system for interstate exchange of criminal history
information. 175
In 1971, the FBI-initiated National Crime Information Center
started a computerized criminal history system called CCH for short. 7 6
The CCH was superimposed over a patchwork of state criminal history
collection efforts and "suffered the drawbacks of operating both as a
168. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER AND THE COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY SYSTEM 3
(1978) [hereinafter A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT].
169. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 25.
170. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 25-26.
171. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26.
172. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26.
173. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26.
174. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 9. See also USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26 (detailing history).
175. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26.
176. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27.
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parallel system, as a supplement to the old arrangement, or in competition
with it as the older system was developed and expanded with new
technologies." 177 Controversy surrounded the CCH over centralization of
control in the FBI, the impact on privacy rights, and fears of overstepping
federalism bounds. 178 Spotty state cooperation stymied effective growth.
Despite heavy federal funding to the states, by 1978, only a dozen states
and the federal government contributed to the CCH. 179  New York and
Pennsylvania, two early participants, withdrew shortly after starting,
refusing to bear the cost of updating records stored federally that duplicated
those held in their state databases. 
180
In 1972, the Department of Justice also began giving money to
states to develop information technology that would facilitate
computerization of records. 181 The Comprehensive Data Systems program,
as the funding program was called, is the precursor to some of the federal-
to-state funding programs of today.
182
Also in the early 1970s, Congress considered several proposals for
uniform national standards for state and localities in the handling of
criminal history information. 183  Strategies for managing criminal history
collection and dissemination evolved against a backdrop of hesitation to
impose tough standards because of federalism fears. Attempts to come up
with federal legislation governing collection and dissemination of criminal
history information foundered on federalism questions relating to
management, oversight, and planning. 1
84
Instead, Congress gestured vaguely at data quality improvement by
amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968185 to
say broadly and generally that criminal history record information collected,
maintained, or disseminated by state and local agencies receiving federal
financial support under the Act must be "complete and secure" and
available for review and challenge by record subjects. 186 The amendment
set no specific standards.
The Justice Department only filled in the vast gray area in the broad
177. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 9.
178. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 3.
179. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 3, 7.
180. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 7.
181. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 26.
182. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE-LEVEL
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTERS AND INFORMATION NETWORK PROGRAM, iii (1996) (stating that the
federal funding program for establishing criminal history analysis centers in each state was first
established in 1972 as a component of the Comprehensive Data Systems Program).
183. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE
PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: 2002 OVERVIEW 4 (2003) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
184. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 3.
185. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 3789g(b),
amended by Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, § 524(b), 87 Stat. 197 (1973).
186. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, supra at 185, recodified at Justice
Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 812(b).
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language a little, "still leav[ing] the States wide discretion to set their own
standards by State legislation and regulations. 187  In 1976, the Justice
Department issued implementing regulations applicable to all states and
local criminal justice agencies receiving federal money from the
Department of Justice for support of criminal history record systems.188
The key regulation setting forth data quality standards, 28 C.F.R. § 20.21,
has remained largely unchanged in wording since the 1970s and remains in
force today.
The regulation calls for covered states to generate operational plans
for their criminal history records systems to "ensure that criminal history
record information is complete and accurate."' 89 "Complete" means that a
record of an arrest "must contain information of any dispositions occurring
within the State within 90 days after the disposition has occurred."' 190
"[A]ccurate means that no record containing criminal history record
information shall contain erroneous information."' 9'
To attain this aspiration, state and local agencies must do two
things. First, "criminal justice agencies shall institute a process of data
collection, entry, storage, and systematic audit that will minimize the
possibility of recording and storing inaccurate information;" second, "upon
finding inaccurate information of a material nature," the agencies must
"notify all criminal justice agencies known to have received such
information."'
9 2
The regulation also made provision-at least aspirationally-for
two modes of accuracy checks. First, the regulation required the state's
operational plan to ensure that the state conduct "annual audits of a
representative sample of State and local criminal justice agencies chosen on
a random basis" to verify adherence with the implementing regulations. 93
Second, the regulation required operating plans to permit record subjects to
view information kept on them to ensure accuracy and completeness. 194
With each plan, the state had to submit a certification that "to the
maximum extent feasible action has been taken to comply with the
procedures set forth in the plan."'195 "Maximum extent feasible" meant
actions that did not entail "additional legislative authority or involve
unreasonable cost or [did] not exceed existing technical ability."'' 96
The federal review provided for in the regulations was an eyeball in
the 1970s. All procedures in the state plan were to be operational and
187. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 47.
188. 28 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2004); COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 4.
189. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a) (2004).
190. Id. § 20.21(a)(1).
191. Id. § 20.21(a)(2).
192. Id. § 20.21(a)(2).
193. Id. § 20.21(e).
194. Id. § 20.21(g).
195. Id. § 20.22(a).
196. Id. § 20.22(a).
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implemented by March 1, 1978 and certification was due then.' 97 Within
ninety days of receipt of the plan, the Department of Justice would examine
the adequacy of the plan and certification. 198 Evaluation of the plan would
"be based upon whether the procedures set forth [would] accomplish the
required objectives."' 199 Evaluation of the certification would "be based
upon whether a good faith effort [had] been shown to initiate and/or further
compliance with the plan and regulations.' 2 °0
The implementing regulations conclude with frail teeth. The
penalties provision states that any agency or individual violating the
regulations will be "subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for a
violation occurring before September 29, 1999, and not to exceed $11,000
for a violation occurring on or after September 29, 1999.,,201 The most
significant sanction is phrased more as a warning: "In addition," the
Department of Justice "may initiate fund cut-off procedures" against
recipients of federal financial assistance.2 °2 Unsurprisingly, well past the
deadline for implementation, in 1982, many states were unable to fully
implement the regulation.20 3
In the 1980s, as data quality continued to be problematic, the debate
continued over whether all records should be stored in a central national
repository or whether the criminal history information storage should be
broken up into many fiefdoms. 20 4 The prevailing view was division into
fiefdoms-no matter how counterintuitive for data quality. The tilt was
toward decentralization because generation and use of criminal history
primarily occurs at the state- and local-level-and states and localities
wanted control.20 5
The federalism theory then dominant was the impenetrable state
functions view of National League of Cities. And the tenor of the dialogue
over the reform of the rap sheet was tinged with National League of Cities'
state turfism. Criminal history reporting was then-as it is now--"viewed
as primarily a law enforcement effort. 20 6 And law enforcement was one of
the traditional state functions identified in National League of Cities.207
A Congressional report of the era noted: "State governments have
basic jurisdiction over law enforcement and criminal justice within their
197. Id. § 20.23.
198. Id. § 20.23.
199. Id. § 20.23.
200. Id. § 20.23.
201. Id. § 20.25.
202. Id. § 20.25.
203. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 144.
204. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES FOR A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY SYSTEM ix (1982) [hereinafter AN ASSESSMENT OF
ALTERNATIVES].
205. Id. at 142.
206. Hillsman, supra note 162, at 55.
207. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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border under their constitutionally reserved powers, and many have been
reluctant to share this jurisdiction with the Federal Government except with
respect to Federal offenders. 2 °8 Of course, states were happy to accept
federal money for development of their records systems so long as the
support was offered "on a voluntary basis and the States retained control
over the operation and use of their own criminal history record systems. 2 °9
Given the law at the time, the report treated turfism as right and proper and
noted that many proposals for a national system "encounter difficulties
resulting from the historic constitutional division of powers and duties in
our Federal system."
210
During the brief regime of National League of Cities,
decentralization won out. By the 1980s, the FBI bowed to complaints about
the practicality and cost of a national centralized system and phased out the
CCH program, replacing it with a decentralized program ceding much
control to the states. 21' The FBI lost steam in pushing the development of
the CCH, and, in a 1976 memorandum, explained why: "lack of state
participation, underestimation of costs and effort which would be required
to establish, collect and maintain data for the more elaborate CCH record
format; nonexistent or slowly developing State technologies; a lack of
required discipline and cooperation within State criminal justice systems;
and the controversy surrounding establishment of the CCH file. 212 Given
the traditional state functions doctrine of the time, Congress had limited
ambit to overcome state turfism with federal standards and coordination.
The system that reformers chose instead lets states be the master of
their criminal history and ties the fiefdoms together through an "index-
pointer" method.21 3 The FBI maintains the Index, called the Interstate
Identification Index (III), "which includes names and identifying data
concerning all persons whose automated criminal history records are
available by means of the III system., 214 The Index "points" the searcher to
the state repositories holding records on the subject. Every state, as well as
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, has a state-level central criminal
history repository.215 Criminal history is compiled by the state in which the
216case originates and is stored by the state's central repositories.
Typically, an arrest triggers the creation of a criminal history record
for the case.21 7  All states statutorily require reporting of arrest
208. AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 204, at 142.
209. AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 204, at 143.
210. AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 204, at 142.
211. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 27.
212. A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, supra note 168, at 12.
213. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 76.
214. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 76.
215. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 6.
216. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 23.
217. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 12. Not all cases begin
with an arrest, however. Some begin with a citation or summons-basically orders to appear-in lieu of
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218information. Almost all states mandate arresting agencies to report
arrests for felonies or serious misdemeanors to a central state repository for
criminal history information.219  Typically, arresting agencies must also
send fingerprints so that the record can be positively identified with the
defendant and linked with prior arrest and convictions.220  A "positive
identification" uses unique and unalterable biometric features, such as
fingerprints, retinal images, or voiceprints, to determine identity. 221  The
booking agency generally gets three sets of fingerprints-one for the
agency, and two for the state repository, which will forward prints to the
FBI in certain cases.222
Shortly after the move to decentralize with the III, Garcia rejected
the traditional state function standard of National League of Cities. But the
III remains in place today. Governance strategies unfold against the
backdrop of law, and when law changes, governments that have committed
infrastructure and political capital to a course cannot easily reverse. And
past timidity in regulation does not easily recede.
The national government remains timid about mandating and
policing criminal history reporting quality standards. The timidity is
understandable in light of the revival of the traditional state functions
doctrine. Despite a plethora of federal funding programs for State criminal
history reporting systems,223 there have been no mandatory conditions
concerning the content of criminal history records.224 The FBI and Bureau
of Justice Statistics have issued voluntary reporting standards with
recommended minimum data elements for arrest and disposition
information reporting. 225 And despite valiant efforts at proposing model
formats for criminal history records, adoption of a model format has never
been made mandatory.226 The result of federal timidity is a confusing
welter of formats, policies on information reporting and data quality
differences. The difficulties stemming from the welter will be analyzed in
the next section.
arrest and booking. Fingerprints must be taken later in the proceedings, after the defendant has
appeared. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 12-13.
218. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 6.
219. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 12.
220. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 12.
221. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2001, vii (2003) [hereinafter SURVEY].
222. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 61.
223. E.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL
HISTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM: IMPROVING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND
CHECKS 1 (2003); see also USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 43, 95-96
(detailing funding programs).
224. INCREASING THE UTILITY, supra note 148, at 10.
225. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 43.
226. INCREASING THE UTILITY, supra note 148, at 10.
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IV. Federal Timidity's Costs
A. The Standards Patchwork and Persistent Data Quality Problems
Consigned to the standards patchwork of more than fifty
jurisdictions, the criminal rap sheet is unsurprisingly deplored as
incomplete, difficult to decipher and sometimes even plain inaccurate. In
1999, federal law enforcement records indicated that incomplete criminal
history records at the State level-particularly incomplete reporting of
dispositions-lead to firearms sales in the previous seven months to about
1,700 people barred from owning or possessing weapons by the Brady
Act.227 An official with the National Center for States Courts has
acknowledged the "great disparity across and within States with regard to
disposition reporting." 228 The problem used to be technology but in recent
decades, as technology has flowered, the impediment is "our governmental
structure, not just State/Federal and State/local, but also interbranch and
interagency.
229
Criminal justice officials "generally agree that unreported arrests
and missing or incomplete disposition data constitute the principal data
quality problem afflicting criminal history record systems. 2 30 A particular
headache for officials attempting to predicate decisions on criminal history
are arrests and charges for which no disposition is noted or dispositions
unlinked to particular charges.2 l
Only ten States estimate that they receive final disposition notices
from either the prosecuting office or court in all cases.232 Only 14 States
and Puerto Rico, which together hold just twenty-seven percent of the
criminal history records in the United States and its territories, have final
dispositions reported for eighty percent or more of the arrests in their
databases.233 In only sixteen States and Puerto Rico are final dispositions
reported for eighty percent or more of arrests within the last five years.234
The jurisdictions account for about forty-three percent of the population of
the United States and its territories. 235 The jurisdictions also account for
about forty-three percent of the criminal history records in the United States
and its territories.236 Underreporting of charges risks hiding the gravity of a
defendant's criminal history and preventing accurate calculation of an
227. Craig Whitlock, Delays in FBI Checks Put 1, 700 Guns in the Wrong Hands; System Failed
to Detect Banned Buyers Within Time Limit, WASH. POST, June 25, 1999, at A01.
228. Hillsman, supra note 162, at 55.
229. Id. at 55.
230. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 39.
231. INCREASING THE UTILITY, supra note 148, at 10.
232. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 4.
233. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 2.
234. SuRvEY, supra note 221, at 2.
235. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 2.
236. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 2.
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appropriately deterrent sentence.
State repositories commonly receive dispositions that do not match
charges initially reported by the police, making the nature of the final
charge of conviction unclear.237 Initial police charges can be changed after
prosecutorial screening, grand jury scrutiny or plea bargaining. 8  Plea
bargaining in particular often leads to changed charges that may not make it
into a repository update. If the charge of conviction is ambiguous or
misstated on a rap sheet, the defendant may be exposed to enhancements or
penalties which should not be leveled or get a worse plea bargain than
would otherwise be made.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions-forty-seven in all-
sometimes receive final court dispositions that they cannot link to arrest
information. 239 The percent of unlinkable dispositions varies from less than
one percent in Nevada to fifty percent in Indiana. 240 Twenty-three states
and the Virgin Islands simply do not enter unlinked court information-
leaving the records open.24' Where no disposition is noted, a rap sheet
reader cannot count what may have been a conviction as one-posing a risk
that the gravity of a defendant's criminal history is not revealed, resulting in
an insufficiently deterrent sentence.
Failure to note dismissal of charges is another major concern. 242
When an arrest is noted and no disposition recorded, the prosecution
appears to be pending, particularly if recent. And even if not recent, the
open listing generates confusion and frustration. Because rap sheets are
notoriously incomplete, an open record may simply mean a delay or failure
in disposition reporting. Though thirty-three States specifically require case
declinations to be reported to the State central repositories, 243 failure to send
notices remains a problem even in the States that mandate that agencies
send notices.2"
Rap sheet users also cannot count on rap sheets being complete in
terms of all convictions being listed. Jurisdictions vary on what kinds of
misdemeanors-if any-are included on the record.245  Some States only
submit fingerprints for felony offenses though most States report felonies
and usually the two or three most serious classes of misdemeanors.246 This
variation may make defendants with similar criminal histories appear
different on their rap sheets, depending on the information storage and
reporting policies of the jurisdictions in which they committed their crimes.
237. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 40.
238. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 40.
239. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 7.
240. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 7.
241. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 7.
242. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 13.
243. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 6.
244. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 13-14.
245. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 41.
246. INCREASING THE UTILITY, supra note 148, at 14.
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This undermines the goal of avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants who in actuality have similar records.
Another major problem stemming from the patchwork is rap sheet
decipherability. Criminal history record formats between states "vary so
greatly that it is probably true that no two State criminal history record
formats are identical and many of them are not even similar., 247  What is
reported differs widely-from little more than arrest charges and final
dispositions to bail and pretrial release data, detention data, charge
modifications by prosecutors, and correctional entry and release data.248
Many states have not generated criminal history records in the
content, format, and time-frame needed for court purposes.249 For example,
courts "need historical data on all dispositions, not just felonies and gross
misdemeanors, and they need information on failures to appear, violent
behavior and other incidents., 250  Timing is critical-for pretrial release
decisions, for example, the information is needed within twenty-four hours
of arrest.25'
Because of "these differences and deficiencies in format, content,
and terminology, many of the criminal history records currently circulated
by the repositories are difficult to decipher"-even by officials in the
criminal justice system.252 The confusing welter of codes and formats
introduce a significant risk of downstream reader error.253
The decentralization of criminal history with the III has made the
confusion even worse. Before, the FBI was responsible for responding to
most national searches and used a standard familiar format for the rap sheet
generated from information in FBI databases. 254  But the index-pointer
approach of the III directs searchers to retrieve records straight from the
various state repositories-which spits out information in a confusing
255 fomrspastiche of formats and codes. As former state governor Dick
Thornburgh noted, the confusing-to-read rap sheets have posed a problem
in law enforcement.256
247. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 41.
248. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 41. For example, release
from state prison must be reported to the repository in twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 3. Release from county jail must be reported in only fifteen
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 3. Probation information
must be reported in thirty-one states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id. Parole information
must be reported in thirty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. SURVEY, supra note 221, at
3.
249. Hillsman, supra note 162, at 56.
250. Hillsman, supra note 162, at 56.
251. Hillsman, supra note 162, at 56.
252. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 42.
253. See, e.g., Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering case where
probation officer misread rap sheet and inaccurately stated in presentence report that the defendant had
four prior convictions rather than one prior conviction and three prior arrests).
254. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 42.
255. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 42.
256. Dick Thornburgh, Keynote Address, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
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Though auditing is generally the most effective measure to ensure
data quality, only a little over half of jurisdictions-thirty-seven states-
statutorily require their central repositories to conduct a data quality
audit.257 Twenty-eight jurisdictions require continuing or periodic audits. 58
Only fifteen states statutorily mandate both an in-house repository audit and
audits of contributing agencies.259
Twenty-five jurisdictions reported in 2001 that no data quality audit
had been conducted in the last five years and twenty-four jurisdictions
reported they were not planning an audit in the next three years.260 Only
twenty-five states and Puerto Rico anticipated performing data quality
audits in the three-year period following 2001 .261 Audits are important.
Twenty-two of twenty-seven states where audits were performed instituted
changes to improve data quality based on the audits.262
Given the confusing welter, it is no surprise that "[t]he type of
incorrect information most consistently triggering reversal is that referring
to prior 'convictions.' 263 Beyond the numbers and official admissions of
rap sheet difficulties, the most forceful illustration of the rap sheet problem
comes in the cases where things went wrong because of bad rap sheet
information.
B. The Cost to Justice
Because unreported arrests and missing or incomplete disposition
data are the principal rap sheet problems,2 6 the typical danger will be
underestimation of the gravity of a defendant's criminal history and
inadequate deterrence. In trying to fashion a sufficiently deterrent sentence
or an appropriate plea bargain, courts and prosecutors may not have all the
defendant's convictions before them, and thus may underestimate the need
for deterrence.
Inadequate deterrence is a serious societal and criminal justice
concern. But it is not the only concern. There is the possibility of another
grave cost to.justice as well. A death penalty case illustrates: A jury found
Cornelius Lewis guilty of murdering a bank security guard during a
robbery. 265 During the hearing on whether to sentence Lewis to death, the
JUSTICE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS:
PROCEEDINGS OF A BJS/SEARCH CONFERENCE, 6 (1992). Thomburgh had become U.S. Attorney
General at the time of his commentary.
257. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 7.
258. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 7.
259. COMPENDIUM, supra note 183, at 8.
260. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 8.
261. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 8.
262. SURVEY, supra note 221, at 8.
263. CAMPBELL, supra note 165, § 9:7, at 372 (2004).
264. USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 1, at 39.
265. Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1449 (7th Cir. 1987).
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prosecutor asked Lewis's attorney to stipulate to the accuracy of Lewis's
FBI rap sheet, which indicated Lewis had four prior felony convictions.266
The prosecutor had certified copies of two of the convictions but could not
get copies for two other listed convictions, felonious assault with a knife in
1965, and felonious assault with a tire iron in 1966.267
The defense attorney showed the rap sheet to Lewis and asked him
if the information was accurate.268 But the defense attorney did not explain
to Lewis the difference between a misdemeanor and a felony or the
difference between an arrest and conviction.269 Lewis said he thought the
rap sheet was accurate so his lawyer stipulated to the accuracy.
270
At the death penalty hearing, the prosecutor told the jury Lewis had
four prior convictions, including convictions for assault with a knife and
tire iron.27' The prosecutor emphasized the prior convictions:
Here's a man who began a career of criminal activity in 1965 and
1966, with attempted assault with a knife, felonious assault with a
tire iron, thirteen years ago. He then graduated, feeling that New
York was no longer safe for his criminal pursuits, moved on to
California. And in California committed second degree robbery.
... And after he was released from the penitentiary in California,
he moved to Minnesota . . . worked on his talents there, and
graduated to bank robbery .... I think that the evidence in this
case, prior criminal convictions of this defendant simply show
that he is a totally anti-social human being. And I think that your
decision as to what ought to be done with him now ought to be
made in that light.
272
Given the "light" the prosecutor created, based on the rap sheet, the jury
sentenced Lewis to death.273
When Lewis appealed, the State's Attorney's Office again tried to
get certified copies of the New York convictions.274 An Assistant State's
Attorney and an Assistant Attorney General succeeded this time in getting
certified records showing that the 1966 tire iron assault charge had been
dismissed and the 1965 charge denoted as attempted felonious assault with
a knife had actually been plead down to a misdemeanor assault
conviction.275 In other words-the rap sheet had been wrong, and the
266. Id. at 1454-55.
267. Id. at 1455.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1449.
274. Id. at 1445.
275. Id. at 1455-56.
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prosecutor's argument to the jury during the death hearing in reliance on the
rap sheet had been wrong.
At this juncture, the prosecutors should have admitted error. Justice
would have borne the expense of another death penalty hearing occasioned
by the inaccurate rap sheet. New proceedings would have been costly-a
collateral consequence of rap sheet problems-but the cost would have
been much less than the toll on the integrity of the justice system and its
officials. But the prosecutors did not confess error and, indeed, referred to
the stipulation of accuracy though knowing the rap sheet was wrong.276 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Lewis's death penalty conviction.277
Only after certiorari was pending for the second time before the
U.S. Supreme Court was Lewis, with the help of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in New York, able to get records showing the accurate
278disposition of his New York convictions. By the time the Seventh Circuit
granted Lewis habeas relief based on the error, Lewis had been on death
row, under apprehension of death, for more than two years.
Cornelius Lewis's case is just one of several where wrong rap sheet
information may have lead to a miscarriage of justice. There are other cases
of claimed injustice tucked away into the state and federal reporters, and
submerged within unpublished dispositions. 27 9  Presentence reports, on
which judges so heavily rely for sentencing, have inaccurately characterized
a defendant's criminal history because of rap sheets. 280 A person has been
arrested based on inaccurate criminal history retrieved by a police officer.28'
These cases show the toll on justice posed by federal timidity. The
next section shows how a full vision of federalism generates a
countervailing principle to the traditional state functions doctrine that
counters the chilling effect on necessary federal leadership.
276. Id. at 1456.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. E.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1995) (considering case where a defendant was
arrested based on inaccurate computerized criminal history information retrieved by a police officer);
Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering case where probation officer
misread rap sheet and inaccurately stated in presentence report that the defendant had four prior
convictions rather than one prior conviction and three prior arrests); McCloud v. United States, 917 F.2d
28 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision) (considering case where defendant contested "grossly
inaccurate and misleading" presentence report that included nine arrests not prosecuted to judgment);
see also Navarro v. City of South Gate, 81 F. App'x. 192, 196 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table
decision) (rejecting § 1983 petitioner's claim that officers submitted an inaccurate rap sheet that lead to
an unwarranted $55,000 increase in his bail for lack of documentation of the claim).
280. Lechner, 341 F.3d at 638-39; McCloud, 917 F.2d 28 (mem.).
281. Evans, 514 U.S. at5.
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V. Developing the National Leadership Principle
A. The Countervailing Bright-Line Rule
The case study of the criminal rap sheet shows the critical need for
development of the nascent countervailing principle to the traditional state
functions doctrine to permit federal leadership and coordination when
necessary on problems submerged in state spheres. The need goes beyond
the prudential. The history of the traditional state functions doctrine shows
the countervailing principle, though nascent, is of constitutional dimension,
derived from the structure of federalism just as the traditional state
functions doctrine is adduced from the structure of federalism.
The intellectual author of the traditional state functions doctrine,
Justice Rehnquist, permitted intervention for "serious problems" where
"collective action by the National government" is necessary.282 The
contours of the countervailing principle were left undefined, however.
Justice O'Connor noted in 1982 that the Court recognized that "'the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state
submission.' 283 But "the Court has not yet explored the circumstances that
might justify such an exception., 284 The Court still has not.
The Court has made clear that the state functions doctrine is a
"functional doctrine" not meant to blindly seal off "a sacred province of
state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a federal system in
which States enjoy a separate and independent existence not be lost through
undue federal interference in certain core state functions. 2 85 The converse
of the "functional" federalism-derived doctrine and "the unique benefits of
a federal system" is national leadership and coordination when necessary.
Federalism's full promise is not achieved when it is wielded solely
as a shield for the states and neglects the place in constitutional design for
federal leadership and coordination when needed.286 As Akhil Reed Amar
has noted, the federalism of the Constitution was brought into being when it
became apparent there was a need for leadership and coordination to avoid
the "shambles" when states exercised their prerogatives under the Articles
of Confederation in disarray.287 American federalism is not the system of
the Articles of Confederation. It is the system of the Constitution that
282. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976).
283. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 778 n.4 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part) (quoting Hodel v. W. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981)).
284. Id.
285. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983) (quoting Nat'I League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845
286. Cf NOONAN, supra note 138, at 3 ("Federalism, in its classic sense, stands for recognition of
the role of the states in the sphere that the constitution allots them in a framework explicitly conferring
great powers on the national government. We are not a confederacy of sovereigns as the secessionists
believed.").
287. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1447-48 (1987).
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supplanted the Articles of Confederation.
Due regard for the constitutional role of the national government in
offering leadership on problems requiring a coordinated solution demands a
countervailing approach for problems requiring a nationally-coordinated
solution. Post-Articles of Confederation federalism is not just about
division and turfism. It is also about relative competence between levels,
and national leadership when needed.
Unrestrained by provision for national coordination when
necessary, the traditional state functions doctrine partakes more of the
repudiated and unworkable Articles of Confederation federalism than the
Constitutional system. But it need not be that way. Part II traced the vein
of a nascent countervailing principle from its roots in Justice Rehnquist's
caveat and Justice Blackmun's concurrence in National League of Cities
through to National League of Cities's demise.
In formulating the traditional state functions doctrine, the Court has
recognized the national leadership aspect to federal design. Key to defining
the contours of the countervailing principle is Justice Blackmun's caveat-
and the condition for his swing vote in National League of Cities. Justice
Blackmun wrote that the traditional state functions doctrine "does not
outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential. 288 Hodel would later
restate the caveat thus: "There are situations in which the nature of the
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission., 289
Though Justice Blackmun called his caveat a "balancing approach" in
his sketch was the root of a standard, not just ad hoc balancing. 290 What
fully-realized federalism requires is a countervailing, bright-line rule
recognizing the role of national leadership on problems requiring a
coordinated solution. What federalism calls for is a countervailing
principle, not a subjective value-laden exception or ad hoc balancing. In as
value-charged, contested and quickly-contorting a field as federalism
doctrine, ad hoc balancing is not the solution. Ad hoc balancing does not
give due force to a principle derived from federal structure. Ad hoc
balancing suggests a concession to the prudential, not derivation in
constitutional structure.
Indeed, the Court has rejected ad hoc balancing in its anti-
29commandeering cases. 91 In New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor
firmly rejected the suggestion that Congress can commandeer states when
the federal interest is great enough to justify state submission. "No matter
how powerful the federal interest involved," Justice O'Connor wrote for the
288. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
289. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981).
290. See Nat I League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856.
291. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
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Court, "the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to
require the States to regulate. 292
The counterweight to what has crystallized as a bright-line rule
shielding traditional state turfs is a similarly bright-line rule to demarcate an
area for federal leadership, similarly derived from the constitutional design
of federalism. A bright line rule, in contrast to ad hoc balancing, is less of
an "invit[ation to] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about
which state policies it favors and which one it dislikes"-and about which
federal policies are favored, for that matter. 293  More fundamentally, a
bright-line rule reflects the derivation of the national coordination principle
from constitutional federal structure.
The key criterion for the principle is evident in Justice Blackmun's
original formulation. Justice O'Connor also saw it: "Whatever the ultimate
content of that standard," Justice O'Connor noted, "it must refer not only to
the weight of the asserted federal interest, but also to the necessity of
vindicating that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state sovereignty."
294
Distilling the criterion to its bright-line essence, the touchstone
should be the necessity of federal policy coordination and leadership. The
nature of the problem must be such that it would persist absent uniform
federal standards. Such a problem would impact citizens across states and
if any State were to opt out of federal regulation, the externalities would be
suffered by all other states. Under these circumstances, federalism requires
that the national government be allowed to realize its constitutionally
ordained role as a policy coordinator and leader, even if the problem
Congress addresses is submerged in a domain, like criminal law,
denominated a traditional state sphere.
When Congress legislates on problems requiring a coordinated
solution, the presumption of impropriety deriving from the traditional
functions doctrine should be inverted. Interpretation of whether the
legislation falls within an enumerated source of Congressional legislative
power should begin with an interpretive receptiveness, though the
legislation affects an issue submerged in a traditional state sphere.
Of course, perceived need for national coordination cannot alone
"call into life a power which has never lived., 295 But recognition of the role
in federalist design for national leadership on issues requiring coordinated
solutions can suspend the rule of constrictive reading of "a living power
already enjoyed., 296
292. Id.
293. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
294. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 782 n.8 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
295. Nat' 7League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
296. Id.
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B. Practical Application-Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet
Theory and principle gain meaning when embodied in practice.
This section analyzes how the national coordination principle would apply
to reforming the criminal rap sheet. Reforming the criminal rap sheet is a
paradigmatic example where the principle would apply. Reforms call for
national policy coordination and innovation and creative applications of
Congress' enumerated powers to legislate. Such Congressional creativity
and policy innovation on a problem submerged in a traditional state sphere
needs a rule of receptivity to succeed.
To create a reliably and consistently accurate rap sheet, centralized
standards on disposition reporting and accuracy verification are needed.
Otherwise, if disposition reporting and accuracy check measures vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the accuracy and completeness will vary
unreliably from sheet to sheet, depending on which reporting jurisdictions
have files on the defendant and the jurisdictions' disposition reporting and
other accuracy measures. To obtain a rap sheet decipherable and
meaningful to criminal justice system officials, the reporting format must be
uniform in both style and substantive content.
Achieving uniform and reliable standards calls for creativity from
Congress in crafting. It is axiomatic that Congress can only legislate under
its enumerated sources of authority. And even if Congress finds an
appropriate wellspring of enumerated authority, it must be careful in
crafting not to run afoul of anti-commandeering rules forbidding direct
commands to the states to enact legislation297 and conscription of state
officials to implement a federal regulatory regime.29s
Congress can harness the spirit of a legal age where "everything old
is new again." 299 Early Congressional legislation can be instructive for a
fresh strategy to manage the modem-day rap sheet problem. Legislation by
the first congresses following the creation of the Constitution "provide[]
contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning.,
300
Such legislation showcases the constitutionally possible in legislative
crafting within Congress' enumerated powers.
Legislation by the first congresses evidence that the national
government may direct state courts to collect and report information. The
Printz Court collected the early legislation:
[T]he first Congresses required state courts to record applications
for citizenship, Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, to
transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other
297. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
298. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
299. Marc E. Johnson, Everything Old Is New Again: Justice Scalia's Activist Originalism in
Schriro v. Summerlin, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763 (2005).
300. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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naturalization records to the Secretary of State, Act of June 18,
1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567, and to register aliens seeking
naturalization and issue certificates of registry, Act of Apr. 14,
1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-155.3°1
Early legislation also prescribed fines for failures by court clerks to meet
federal reporting requirements.30 2 State courts, unlike state legislatures and
executives, could be commanded by federal law to enforce federal law and
"maintain . . . the ancillary functions of recording, registering, and
certifying the citizenship applications. 30 3
Herein lays a solution to the chief problem plaguing the criminal
rap sheet: variable disposition reporting. Congress could mandate that state
courts retain, in scanned retrievable form, prescribed judicial records made
or used in adjudicating guilt. As a practical matter, the federal mandate
must come with the federal funds for electronic storage systems upgrades
and training in the state courts.
The need for national leadership on setting criminal history
collection and retention standards is particularly acute after the 2005
decision of Shepard v. United States.3° In Shepard, prosecutors faced with
proving the nature of a defendant's past burglary convictions for purpose of
a statutory sentence enhancement, ran into a problem: The state court had
failed to retain the record of the plea colloquy and plea agreement in which
the defendant would have admitted the circumstances surrounding the
offense.30 5 The prosecutor succeeded in getting police arrest reports and
complaint applications which showed that the details of the burglaries
satisfied the requisites for the enhancement-information the defendant did
not contradict.30 6 Nonetheless, Shepard held that disputed facts about a
prior conviction triggering an increase in the prescribed maximum must be
proven through conclusive judicial records made or used in adjudicating
guilt. 30 7 As Justice O'Connor observed in dissent, this left sentencing and
implementation of Congressionally-prescribed statutory enhancements
dependent on disparate state record retention policies.30 8
The records requisite also poses a substantial burden to law
enforcement. Currently, getting certified judgment and conviction
documents is, to put it plainly, a big pain. Agents and officers whose time
would be much better spent elsewhere have to serve as highly-trained
administrative assistants, on the phone to clerks in disparate jurisdictions,
seeking judgment and conviction documents that sometimes do not reliably
301. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-06.
302. Id. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 908 n.2.
304. United States v. Shepard, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).
305. See Id. at 1269 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 1258-59 (majority in part).
307. Id. at 1260, 1263 (majority in part, plurality in part).
308. Id. at 1269.
[Vol. 33:1
Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet
come, or do not come on time. Papers and files get lost or are tucked into
storage, complicating matters more. The documents are key to accurate
justice but getting them involves a highly inefficient process and diverts law
enforcement man-hours better spent on important issues like investigation
and catching criminals.
Congress can creatively solve the problem by mandating that state
courts retain in electronically retrievable format scanned certified copies of
judgments of conviction, plea documents, and charging documents. Federal
legislation could also provide for information retrieval directly from the
state courts using the Interstate Identification Index.
Currently, the Index retrieves information from various state
repositories, which depends on court reporting for accurate information.
Direct retrieval from the courts would ameliorate the current problem of
information reporting resembling a game of "Telephone," with information
lost along the way. With linkages to the Interstate Identification Index,
accessing conclusive records made or used in adjudicating guilt can be as
easy as clicking a button to download the electronically stored document.
This would mitigate the waste of law enforcement man-hours spent on the
phone to various jurisdictions, trying to track down and obtain criminal
history records.
State repositories will, of course, still play a critical role in the
foreseeable future because of the vast amount of past conviction
information stored in the repositories and the current infrastructure set-up
for retrieval from state repositories. Standardizing information retention
and reporting standards for state repositories may appear to be a trickier
question because the legislation must be predicated on an enumerated
power and avoid anti-commandeering rules. But the Constitution offers a
grant of authority in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Article IV, Section 1
of the Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.
309
An accurate rap sheet effectuates the Full Faith and Credit Clause and is a
"Manner in which [state] Acts, Records, and Proceedings" are "proved" to
criminal justice officials-often in different jurisdictions-at various stages
of proceedings, such as detention hearings, and plea bargain formulation.
The Supreme Court has characterized early federal legislation3t ° that
mandated procedures state officials must follow during criminal extradition
as an exercise of Article IV, § 1 power and outside the purview of its anti-
309. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
310. Extradition Act of 1793, Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302.
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commandeering rules.31' Similarly, congressionally prescribed procedures
that state officials must follow in rap sheet information collection, storage,
audits and dissemination fall outside the purview of anti-commandeering
rules.312
Do these proposed reforms call for creative adaptation of
congressional authority to the problems of the modem age and its mobile
criminals? Yes, particularly with regard to the use of Article IV, § 1
authority. That is where the national coordination principle comes into
play. The national coordination and leadership principle would suspend the
rules of constrictive and crippling readings of federal legislation and
legislative power under the traditional state functions doctrine. To permit
full fruition of federalism design, the countervailing principle would instead
have a receptive interpretive rule.
Just as the traditional state functions rule has inflected Court
interpretation of the bounds of congressional power to enact legislation,313
so the countervailing national coordination and leadership principle should
inflect constitutional interpretation. The Court has in essence read
Congressional legislative power to weaken in reach when it extends to
traditional state functions out of respect for the role of States in provision of
such services. Court scrutiny is therefore exacting when it comes to
congressional enactments trenching on traditional state functions.314
For problems requiring nationally coordinated solutions, however,
the national leadership principle suspends the rule of constrictive
interpretation. The national coordination and leadership principle permits a
converse rule of interpretation receptive to Congressional policy
innovations. This ensures due respect for the role of national leadership and
coordination in federal design and the full fruition of the federalism the
Constitution wrought to supplant the state-centrism of the Articles of
Confederation. And it ensures that problems submerged in state spheres
requiring national coordination do not fester unaddressed because of federal
timidity in the face of a powerful rule of noninterference with no
countervailing principle.
311. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909 n.3 (1997).
312. Other statutes also impose reporting requirements, such as the requirement in 42 U.S.C.
§ 5779(a) that states and local law enforcement report missing children to the Department of Justice.
The Court has not decided whether such "purely ministerial reporting requirements" pursuant to
Commerce Clause authority are invalid. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As
discussed, however, Article IV, § 1 provides a more directly moored grant of authority to legislate in the
case of rap sheet reporting.
313. See supra, Part II.C.2.
314. See supra, Part IlCI..
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